Under the ideal of the value-free science, it is easy to attribute to science a special kind of authority within the political sphere, as contributing a set of claims that are not “up for debate.” The source of scientific authority is a special kind of political autonomy; science answers only to the truth, not to the people or to politicians. But the value-free ideal is untenable; a science with unrestricted authority and autonomy is thus intolerable (Douglas, 2009). For this reason, the role of scientific knowledge and scientific experts in free societies is further problematized. Can science legitimately have a special authority in the political sphere, even over matters of fact, if those facts are value-laden? Should the public trust science, and if so, under what conditions? (Since the answer cannot be, when it is unbiased, value-free, etc.) In this talk, I trace some recent moves in discussions of public understanding of science, public trust in science, and science-based policy before arguing that the key issue here  is to take up the question of “political legitimacy” from political philosophy in application to scientific institutions and scientific knowledge. 

Matthew J. Brown is Director of the Center for Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology, Program Head for History and Philosophy, and Professor of Philosophy and History of Ideas at the University of Texas at Dallas. His 2020 monograph, Science and Moral Imagination: A New Ideal for Values in Science (University of Pittsburgh Press) explores the role of values in science and the scientific basis of values from a Deweyan pragmatist perspective.

This talk is being put on in partnership with The SEPOS Group (Socially Engaged Philosophy of Science)